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1What do internal capital markets do? Redistribution vs.
incentives
Abstract
In this paper we explain the apparent "diversi¯cation discount" of conglomerates without
assuming ine±cient-cross subsidisation through internal capital markets. Instead we assume
that an internal capital market e±ciently redistributes scare resources across a conglomerate's
divisions between successive production periods. The need for redistribution arises from the
fact that resources may sometimes be produced by divisions which happen to be successful in
an earlier production stage but which do not have the best investment opportunities in future
production stages.
In contrast to the existing literature we consider explicitly the incentive problem between
corporate headquarter and divisional managers using a standard Moral-Hazard framework. We
show that although a complete incentive contract can be written bi-laterally between headquarter
and divisional managers, the redistribution of resources across divisions creates additional agency
costs in a conglomerate.
Moreover, assuming that no complete contract can govern the interim redistribution policy
by the headquarter, we show how the agency problem with divisional managers constrains
headquarters interim redistribution to be ex ante ine±cient.
JEL-Classi¯cation codes: G31, G34, L23
21 Introduction
The main economic e®ect that our paper aims to capture is that of a classical capital budgeting
process within a conglomerate. There are scarce resources and the conglomerate's board of
directors, i.e. corporate headquarter, has to decide which of the conglomerate's divisions should
be allocated those funds knowing that not all projects can be funded. We show that in a
conglomerate the reallocation of scarce resources and the provision of incentives to produce
those resources are intricately linked.
It has long been argued informally that the reallocation of scare resources is one of the most
important tasks for corporate headquarter: "In many respects, this assignment of cash °ows
to high yield uses is the most fundamental attribute of the M-form enterprise." ( Williamson
[1975], p. 147f, our italics) or "The most critical choices top management makes are those that
allocate resources among competing strategic investment opportunities." ( Donaldson [1984],
p.95, our italics). Lamont [1997] and Shin & Stulz [1998] provided evidence that conglomerates
indeed do redistribute resources using an active internal capital market.
Although internal capital markets play an important role in conglomerates, there is a puzzle.
At ¯rst sight it seems possible to argue that an internal capital market adds value due to
its information advantage over external capital markets (see for example Alchian [1969], p.
349) The argument however is at odds with evidence that conglomerates destroy value ( Lang
& Stulz [1994], Berger & Ofek [1995], Comment & Jarrell [1995]). They typically trade at
a discount compared to a portfolio of stand-alone ¯rms which replicates the conglomerates
operating divisions.
An explanation of the conglomerate discount in terms of internal capital markets is that
corporate headquarter instead of distributing resources towards the most productive divisions,
ine±ciently cross-subsidizes them ( Scharfstein [1998], Scharfstein & Stein [2000], Rajan & al
[2000]).1 The reason why internal capital markets are ine±cient, these papers argue, is that
they are captured by managers and directors to ¯ght power struggles over the control of the
conglomerate's resources.
The empirical evidence supporting the cross-subsidisation, or "corporate socialism" hypoth-
esis, however has recently come under some criticism. Chevalier [2000] shows that one can
replicate the evidence that is cited in support of "corporate socialism" by looking at ¯rms that
are going to merge in the future but which are not integrated yet. Without integration there
cannot be cross-subsidisation to explain the evidence. Maksimovic & phillips [1999] shows that
there are no signs of ine±cient cross-subsidisation when more micro-level data is used than what
is usually done.
Our paper shows how the conglomerate discount can be explained without assuming ine±-
cient cross-subsidisation through ine±cient internal capital markets.
Suppose that we have a conglomerate with an e±cient internal capital market, i.e. corporate
headquarter, which owns the production assets of the conglomerate, allocates scarce resources to
the most productive division. Moreover, it is possible that a division that has performed well in
the past may no be the most productive division in the future. The internal capital market serves
to channel scarce resources between production periods from previously successful divisions to
divisions that will be successful in the future.
There is one more important task for corporate headquarter beyond channelling scarce re-
sources across divisions during production. Corporate headquarter lacks the skill of running
1There is a large literature on the diversi¯cation discount not based on internal capital markets. For references,
see Villalonga [2000].
3production assets and therefore has to employ managers to run the divisions. Since divisional
managers dislike hard work, they have to be induced to work hard through appropriate incen-
tive contracts. The other important task for corporate headquarter then is to hire divisional
managers and design their incentive contracts.
Our main result is that there are costs of running an internal capital market although there is
no ine±cient cross-subsidisation as such. The costs of running an internal capitals market have
two sources: the necessity of having an ad-interim e±cient redistributive policy and the changes
in the managerial incentives when there is redistribution between the successive production
periods.
Our main assumption is that corporate headquarter can bi-laterally write complete incentive
contracts with each divisional manager but there is no complete, multi-lateral contract that
governs the corporate headquarter's decision of how to channel scarce resources across divisions.
The inability of ¯xing ex-ante, i.e. before managers decide whether to work hard, which division
looses its resources and which division gains new ones is at the root of the ¯rst cost of running
an internal capital market: the cost of ad-interim e±ciency.
To explain that, suppose that the conglomerate wants to replicate the behavior of single
division ¯rms. In this case, each division should rely on its own resources to ¯nance its investment
projects and the headquarter should not redistribute resources in between divisions.
Suppose that the most pro¯table division is short in resource and cannot ¯nance its project.
If there are resources elsewhere in the ¯rm, the corporate headquarter has an incentive to take
this resources away from the divisions that produce them, to ¯nance the most pro¯table division.
Then, the only way for the headquarter to commit to replicate the single division behavior, is to
give to the manager of the most productive division a higher claim in the pro¯t of his division.
In this case, even the division is a lot more productive, the headquarter has no incentive to
redistribute resources to this division, as he will get only a small share of its pro¯t. To support
a given redistributive policy (no redistribution in this case), the headquarter has to modify the
managerial contracts, in order to make the redistributive policy ad-interim e±cient.
Now consider the problem of managerial incentives. We suppose that the contract between
the headquarter and the manager speci¯es a managerial share in the pro¯t of his division. By
operating an internal capital market, the corporate headquarter decides which divisions will be
continued and which divisions will be liquidated (because sometimes, he lacks the resources to
¯nance all the projects). Therefore, the incentive to work of the managers are changed if they
know that their division will be re¯nanced whatever the resources they produce, because the
divisions have a high future pro¯t or if they won't be re¯nanced, even they produce enough
resources.
Let us explain that in more detail. In the absence of reallocation, a manager only receives a
payment when his division succeeds. Only then are there resources that can be used to re¯nance
and continue the division, in which case the manager receives a share in ¯nal pro¯ts. If his divi-
sion fails then there are no resources which means that the division cannot be continued. Also,
since there are no resources, the manager receives nothing. Since a manager can increase the
probability of success by working hard, the headquarter can write incentive contracts contingent
on success and failure which induce divisional managers to work hard.
A reallocation of resources now distorts managerial incentives in the following way. Suppose
that division 1 has high future productivity but, due to bad luck, was previously unsuccessful
and has failed to produce any resources. Division 2 in contrast has low future productivity but
was previously successful and has produced resources. Corporate headquarter now allocates the
resources e±ciently by taking them away from division 2, which is rich in resources, and giving
4them to division 1, which is poor in resources. Divisional managers anticipate the possibility of
a reallocation which makes it more di±cult for corporate headquarter to induce them to work
hard in the ¯rst place.
To see this consider ¯rst the manager of division 2. He anticipates that in some cases his
division will be liquidated although it succeeded in order to transfer its resources to division 1.
In other words, the manager of division 2 no longer receives his share of ¯nal pro¯ts when his
division 2 succeeds but only when his division 2 succeeds and division 1 succeeds too. Only in
that case there are enough resources available to re¯nance both divisions. Since the manager of
division 2 receives his share of ¯nal pro¯ts less often, that share must be larger for him to be
still willing to work hard.2
Consider now the manager of division 1. He anticipates that in some cases his division will
not be liquidated although it failed. Not only does he receives his share of ¯nal pro¯t when his
division succeeds, but also when his division fails and division 2 succeeds. Since a high e®ort
from him is no longer linked to a higher probability of success when division 2 succeeds, his
incentive to work hard is weakened. In order to make up for a weaker incentive to work hard, he
must receive a larger share of ¯nal pro¯ts. In addition to receiving a larger share, he also receives
that share more often. It is the cost of inducing the manager of division 1, i.e. the unsuccessful
but pro¯table division to which funds are given, which drives our ¯rst result: agency costs are
larger in a conglomerate with an e±cient internal capital market.
This problem of higher payments to managers interact with the problem of ad-interim e±-
ciency. The internal capital market is ad-interim e±cient if the headquarter prefers to re¯nance
the most pro¯table division with the resources of the less pro¯table one. If the manager of the
most productive division receives a larger of the pro¯t than the manager of the less productive
division, it is possible that even if division 1 has a larger pro¯t, the share of this pro¯t going
to the headquarter is too small and he prefers to leave the resources inside the less productive
division. To commit to re¯nance the most productive division, the headquarter should increase
the share of the pro¯t he leaves to the manager of the less productive division. In this case, the
transfer policy will be ad-interim e±cient.
From the previous discussion, it appears that a consequence of operating an internal capital
market is an increase in the managerial shares of the pro¯t for a given level of e®ort. Facing
these higher payments, the headquarter will sometimes reduce them by reducing the level of
e®ort of the managers. So the additional costs of the internal capital market are either an
higher payment to managers or a lower e®ort level (or both).
There is one more cost associated with the internal capital market that we have not mentioned
yet. In a stand alone ¯rm, the headquarter can commit to continue the ¯rm if it succeeds by
giving a 'golden parachute' to the manager if the division is liquidated. The ¯rm is continued if its
continuation pro¯t is greater than its liquidation value minus the golden parachute. If this latter
is very high, a pro¯table ¯rm is always continued. When the headquarter operates an internal
capital market, some divisions are liquidated because their resources are needed elsewhere in the
¯rm. But as resources are scare, the headquarter cannot pay a golden parachute to the manager
of the liquidated division and use these resources to ¯nance the other division. The absence of
the golden parachute is a problem when there are enough resources to continue all the divisions.
If all divisions are pro¯table, and if all can be ¯nanced, all should be continued. In the absence of
the golden parachute, the headquarter pays nothing to the manager if he liquidates his division.
2In expectation, the manager of division 2 is paid the same as in the stand-alone case. So the expected agency
cost for that manager is not bigger in a conglomerate. But we will see in a moment that the manager's larger
share of ¯nal pro¯ts contributes to the problem of ad-interim e±ciency.
5And this distorts the decision to continue a division. The divisions with a small continuation
value will be ine±ciently liquidated. In the paper, we show that reducing the amount of e®ort
is an alternative to the golden parachute to commit to continue the pro¯table divisions when
there are enough resources.
We have shown that there are additional agency cost when the headquarter operates an
internal capital market. But there are also bene¯ts as the headquarter can use the scare resources
to re¯nance the most productive projects rather than the project in the divisions that created
the resources. When there is a division that is a lot more pro¯table than the other, the bene¯ts
exceed the cost and there is a conglomerate premium. Otherwise, there is a conglomerate
discount unless the conglomerate could replicate the stand alone behavior at no cost. Which is
the case when there is little heterogeneity across the divisions' pro¯ts.
As far as we are aware there is no other paper that analyses the working of internal capital
markets and explicitly considers managerial incentive contracts. Managerial pay is a variable in
our model as opposed to a parameter like in the ine±cient cross-subsidisation literature. There,
managers mechanically receive an unspeci¯ed "private bene¯t" that is in ¯xed proportion to the
funds they control.
E±cient internal capital markets were ¯rst analyzed by Stein [1997] but his model neither
considers managerial moral hazard nor are funds reallocated between production periods. Br-
usco & Panunzi [2000] have a model that is similar in spirit to ours since they consider the
impact of a reallocation of funds on managerial incentives. In substance however, their model is
quite di®erent. Firstly, there is no explicit incentive contracting problem. They use the private
bene¯ts framework where managerial pay-o® is exogenous. Secondly, headquarter does not real-
locate funds since productive divisions happen to be poor in resources but because headquarter
discovers new information about the productivity of divisions. Thirdly, in their model the man-
ager of the more productive division has more incentives to work hard. In our model, he has
less incentives to work hard. Fourthly, they do not consider the constraints on headquarter's
decision to continue divisions and transfer funds at the interim stage. And ¯nally, they use a
model speci¯cation that makes the conglomerate's total value independent of managerial e®ort.
Section 2 introduces our model of a two-divisional ¯rm that operates for two production
periods. In order to highlight the role of an internal capital market in our set-up, section 3 takes
a step backward and analyses the Stand-Alone benchmark case when there is no internal capital
market. Section 4 then examines the case when there is an internal capital market. Section 5
shows that there is a conglomerate discount when the productivity di®erence between divisions
is neither too large nor too small. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a ¯rm that operates for two periods and that is composed of two divisions and a
headquarter. The headquarter (the principal) owns all productive assets but it has no expertise
in managing them. Hence, it employs two self-interested managers (the agents) to run the
divisions and it controls them through incentive contracts. If divisional managers work hard in
the ¯rst period, they positively a®ect their divisions performance at the end of the ¯rst period.
At that interim stage, the headquarter can then decide what to do with a division's resources.
The headquarter can either decide to continue a division for the second period, it can liquidate
its assets or it can transfer its assets to another division. In other words, the headquarter can
operate an internal capital market between the two production periods. Figure 1 illustrates the
sequence of events.
6In our set-up all parties are risk-neutral and the risk-free interest rate is normalized to zero.
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Figure 1: The timing of events
2.1 Production technology in a division
Production takes place for two periods. The higher the e®ort put in by the manager of division i,
the better the interim performance of his division at the end of the ¯rst period. More precisely,
it he exerts a high e®ort eh then with probability p the division is worth 1 and with probability
(1¡p) it is worthing nothing. If he exerts a low e®ort el then with probability q<pthe division
is worth 1 and with probability (1 ¡ q) it is worth nothing. Exerting a high e®ort costs the
manager c while exerting a low e®ort costs him nothing.
There will be production in a division for a second period only if 1 unit of resources is
reinvested at the interim stage between the production periods. If a division continues to operate
for a second period then it yields a ¯nal value of °i® for sure. Hence, the ex-ante expected value
of a division that is continued and where the manager works hard is p°i®: Note that the division
has a positive Net Present Value (NPV) in the second period if °i®>1 :
The divisions' production technologies are independent in the sense that division i's produc-
tion technology does not depend on division j's production technology and a divisional manager's
e®ort only a®ects the performance of his own division.
Note that ®; as opposed to °; is not indexed by i: ® represents common productivity across
all divisions while °i which represents the extra pro¯tability of division i: Except for °i all
divisions possess the same production technology.
2.2 The internal capital market
Suppose for a moment that the headquarter does not have the possibility to redistribute resources
at the interim stage between the two production periods. In that case, each division must rely
on its own resources in order to be re¯nanced and to continue production for a second period. If
a division was successful in the ¯rst period and produced 1 unit of interim resources then this 1
unit can be used to re¯nance and continue the division to yield a ¯nal value °i®. Alternatively,
a successful division could be stopped and its interim resources be liquidated for their full value
of 1. It is e±cient to re¯nance a division if it has a positive NPV in the second production
period, i.e. if °i®>1 :
If in contrast a division was unsuccessful in the ¯rst period then there is no choice. In the
absence of any interim resources of its own, a division must be stopped even though it may be
very pro¯table in the second period.
7Both divisions succeed Only division 1 succeeds Only division 2 succeeds Both divisions fail
continue both continue 1, stop 2 stop 1, continue 2 stop both
continue 1, stop 2 stop both stop both
stop 1, continue 2
stop both
Table 1: No internal capital market: possible strategies
Table 1 summarizes the headquarter's possible actions between the production periods in
the case of two divisions when it cannot redistribute resources. The four contingencies that the
headquarter must consider are given in the title row. Each column shows which actions are
possible. For example, if only division 1 has succeeded then, without an internal capital market,
division 1 can be stopped or continued but division 2 must be stopped.
If the headquarter does have the possibility to redistribute resources at the interim stage,
i.e. if there is an internal capital market, then it is possible to re¯nance and to continue a
division that was unsuccessful in the ¯rst production period. For example, even though division
1 was not able to generate resources on its own it can still be re¯nanced if headquarter transfers
resources from division 2 to division 1: This requires that division 2 was successful in the ¯rst
production period and that division 2 is then stopped and liquidated.3 We assume that there
cannot be partial liquidation or partial continuation. A division's resources are just enough to
re¯nance another division.4
We have deliberately introduced the notion of indivisibility since it captures the fact that
in a capital budgeting process, corporate headquarter has to make decisions between various
mutually exclusive alternatives. For example an R&D project can only be brought to the
production stage if the production plant is built. If the plant is not built then all the budgeted
money is available to other projects. If the plant is built then the money is not available.5
Table 2 summarizes the headquarter's possible strategies when there is an internal capital
market. The di®erence to case without an internal capital market is that we add a possible
action in the cases when only one division succeeds. Headquarter can now stop the successful
division and continue the unsuccessful one. If both divisions have a positive NPV in the second
production period then it is e±cient to transfer resources from division 2 to division 1 when the
latter is more pro¯table, i.e. when °1 >° 2:
At the beginning of the ¯rst production period the divisions are already endowed with
resources and all the resources that are redistributed between the ¯rst and the second production
period are internally generated. There is no access to external capital market in our set-up.6;7
3For simplicity we assume that there is no di®erence in liquidating inside an internal capital market or outside
it. Furthermore, in both cases it is possible to liquidate e±ciently. Gertner & al [1994] however sees e±cient
liquidation as one of the main advantages of an internal capital market as opposed to liquidation through an
external investor, say a bank.
4If there were some "cash left on the table" at the interim stage we would complicate our model without gaining
additional insights. Alternatively one could for example assume that all free-cash is paid out to shareholders.
5Di®erent decisions by corporate headquarter will result in di®erent incentive constraints for it at the interim
stage between production periods. This insight is lost if we assume that capital budgeting is a perfectly divisible
process.
6This is for simplicity only. All we need is that resources are scarce. If we want to be more explicit, we could
for example argue along the lines of Stein [1997] and say that access to external capital markets is limited due to
asymmetric information.
7Models that consider the role of internal capital markets in relation to external ¯nance are Scharfstein &
Stein [2000] and Inderst & Muller [2000].
8Both divisions succeed Only division 1 succeeds Only division 2 succeeds Both divisions fail
continue both continue 1, stop 2 stop 1, continue 2 stop both
continue 1, stop 2 stop both stop both
stop 1, continue 2 stop 1, continue 2 continue 1, stop 2
stop both
Table 2: Internal capital market: possible strategies
2.3 Information and contracts
Headquarter has no expertise in managing production and therefore has to employ self-interested
managers. To control their behavior and to compensate them for their costly e®ort, it gives them
incentive contracts at the beginning of the ¯rst production period. Since divisional managers'
e®ort is not observable, their incentive contracts cannot be directly contingent it. In other words,
there is a Moral-Hazard problem at the divisional level.
The incentive contract for divisional manager i speci¯es two payments. If his division is
re¯nanced for a second production period he receives a share ±i 2 [0;1] of the ¯nal liquidation
proceeds °i® at the end of the production process. A manager's division can also be liquidated
at the end of the ¯rst production period no matter whether the division has succeeded or
failed. Since we impose that all contracting parties are protected by limited liability, a divisional
manager cannot receive anything if his division is liquidated after failing in the ¯rst period.8 In
that case there are no liquidation proceeds. If his division is liquidated after succeeding in the
¯rst period period he receives a share Wi 2 [0;1] of the 1 unit of interim liquidation proceeds.
The form of incentive contracts is therefore quite simple. The share ±i represents a continu-
ation reward, for example a wage or a bonus, and the share Wi represents a form of severance
pay or "golden parachute" that the manager receives when his division is liquidated although it
has been successful.9
Interim cash-°ows are observable but not contractible. Since headquarter owns productive
assets, it possesses the residual controls right over them. Therefore, it is the headquarter which
uses the internally generated resources at the interim stage as it sees ¯t. Were interim cash-°ows
contractible then there is no need for corporate headquarter to operate an internal capital market
since it could write a comprehensive contract with all divisions that speci¯es which division is
re¯nanced under which circumstances.10
There is no asymmetric information between headquarter and divisional managers (and
among divisional managers) beyond their individual e®ort levels. In particular, the second period
productivity of each division, °i®; is known to everybody. This means that headquarter will
be able to operate an e±cient internal capital market by channelling funds to more productive
divisions.11
8That limited liability imposes a zero payment in one of the contingencies creates a standard moral-hazard
problem although all parties are risk-neutral.
9Note that a divisional manager's incentive contract only depends on the performance of his own division.
What we e®ectively assume is that a conglomerate does not use more complicated incentive contracts than a
one-divisional ¯rm.
10If interim cash-°ows were contractible one could also write much more complicated incentive contracts. So
far, the incentive contracts only require that liquidation and its proceeds are veri¯able.
11In contrast, Stein [1997] assumes that divisional managers have superior information and that the task for the
headquarter is to elicit that information. In Brusco & Panunzi [2000] headquarter receives a signal that informs
him about the productivity of divisions. In Inderst & Laux [2000] the productivity of divisions itself depends on
managerial e®ort.
9Finally, we assume that there is no con°ict of interest between the owners of the ¯rm and
corporate headquarter. Headquarter maximizes the total value if the ¯rm net of incentive
payments to managers. Managers however do not care about the value of the ¯rm, they are only
interested in the incentive payments they receive.12
3 No internal capital market
In this section we concentrate on the case when there is no internal capital market to redistribute
resources. Initially we consider a one ¯rm with one single division i in order to illustrate the
moral-hazard problem between the headquarter and the division manager and to show how the
incentive contract written by the headquarter interacts with its decision to continue or stop a
division. We ¯rst present a First-Best situation where e®ort is contractible and then look at
the Second-Best situation where e®ort is not contractible. We also introduce our Stand-Alone
benchmark for the remainder of the analysis by asking: what is the value of a portfolio of two
independent single ¯rms with one division each.
The section also introduces some assumptions that make the analysis of the case with an
internal capital market more tractable.
3.1 A single ¯rm with one division: First Best
Suppose for a moment that the e®ort level of a divisional manager is contractible so that there
is no moral hazard. The aim of this section is to illustrate the constraints on headquarter's
behavior at the interim stage between the two production periods.
If division i was successful and has generated 1 unit of resources in the ¯rst production period,
then headquarter can either continue or liquidate the division. As the decision is not contractible,
headquarter continues the division if and only if its continuation valueCi(±i) ´ (1¡±i)°i® exceeds
its liquidation value Li(Wi)=1¡W iat the interim stage:
Ci(±i) ¸ Li(Wi) , (1 ¡ ±i)°i® ¸ 1 ¡ Wi (1)
It is clear that by choosing the continuation reward ±i and the golden parachute Wi headquarter
not only compensates divisional managers for their e®ort, but also modi¯es its decision to
continue or liquidate a successful division.
Let us now go through both possibilities, continuation and liquidation, bearing in mind that
e®ort is, for the sake of this section only, observable. In other words, headquarter can just tell his
divisional manager whether to work hard or not. Consider ¯rst the case when the headquarter
wants to liquidate a successful division so that the relevant payment to his manager is the
golden parachute Wi. If headquarter imposes a high e®ort then it just pays enough to so that
his manager is indi®erent between working for the ¯rm and quitting, i.e. until his Participation
Constraint binds: pWi = c: Headquarter ¯nds it optimal to liquidate a successful division at the
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p
12This is di®erent from models in the private bene¯ts tradition. There both headquarter and managers are
interested in value maximizing. Ine±ciencies there typically arise from the fact that each party wants to maximize
t h ev a l u eo fh i sown realm.
10We see that by choosing a su±ciently large continuation reward, for example ±i =1 ;headquarter
can always commit itself ex-ante to liquidate a successful division at the interim stage.
Headquarter wants to impose a high e®ort when it is more pro¯table than a low e®ort,
p(1 ¡ c
p) ¸ q () p ¡ q ¸ c; i.e. when the marginal bene¯t of high e®ort exceeds its marginal
cost.13
Consider now the case when headquarter wants to continue a successful division. Now the
relevant payment to his divisional manager is ±i. If headquarter imposes a high e®ort then it
just needs to satisfy the manager's Participation Constraint, p°i®±i = c: Headquarter ¯nds it




) ¸ Li(Wi) , (1 ¡
c
p°i®
)°i® ¸ 1 ¡ Wi
Headquarter can commit itself ex-ante to continue a successful division by paying a very large
golden parachute, for example Wi =1 :It prefers to impose a high e®ort on its manager when the
division's second period NPV exceeds the ratio of marginal cost to marginal bene¯t, p°i®(1 ¡
c
p°i®) ¸ q°i® () ° i® ¸ c
p¡q : 14
The following proposition states that in the First-Best case in a one-divisional ¯rm, head-
quarter continuation decision is e±cient. Without divisional moral-hazard managers work hard
when the marginal bene¯t of high e®ort exceeds its marginal cost.
Proposition 1 When managerial e®ort is contractible then a single division is continued i® it
has a positive NPV for the second period, °i® ¸ 1. Headquarter always imposes a high e®ort on
the divisional manager when the marginal bene¯t of high e®ort exceeds its cost, p ¡ q ¸ c:
Proof. In the appendix.
The intuition for proposition 1 is that since headquarter can perfectly commit itself ex-ante,
it pays the manager the same in expectation in both the liquidation and continuation case.
Hence, the ex-ante decision to continue or liquidate is identical to the e±cient interim decision.
To have an interesting problem we will assume that the headquarter wants the manager to
always exert a high e®ort in the First Best benchmark.
Assumption 1 The marginal cost of high e®ort exceeds its marginal cost: c
p¡q < 1:
The First-Best continuation continuation reward contract then is, ±FB
i = c
p°i®:
3.2 A single ¯rm with one division: Second Best
If e®ort is not contractible then there is moral-hazard at the divisional level. Instead of imposing
the desired e®ort level, headquarter must now induce it through appropriate incentive payments.
Again, we have to consider both the continuation and the liquidation case separately.
If headquarter wants to continue a successful division and wants the manager to exert a high
e®ort then the continuation reward ±i must be incentive compatible, i.e. with that reward the
13Should the headquarter still want to liquidate a successful division but impose a low e®ort on his manager
then it need not pay him any golden parachute Wi = 0. Again, headquarter can ex-ante commit to liquidation
with ±i = 1. The expected bene¯t to headquarter of these actions is q:
14The incentive payments for the low e®ort and continuation case are ±i = 0 and Wi = 1 so that the expected
pay-o® to headquarter is q°i®:
11divisional manager must indeed prefer to work hard than to not work hard:
p°i®±i ¡ c ¸ q°i®±i (2)
Headquarter pays the least possible amount ±i = c
(p¡q)°i®: The amount is higher than the
corresponding payment in the First-Best case and therefore satis¯es the Participation Constraint
with slack. Since the manager can no longer be told what to do, the manager must expect to
get some share of the production surplus.




) ¸ Li(Wi) , (1 ¡
c
(p ¡ q)°i®
)°i® ¸ 1 ¡ Wi
so that headquarter can again commit itself ex-ante to continuation with a very large golden
parachute, e.g. Wi =1 . 15
If headquarter wants to liquidate a successful division and wants to induce the manager
to work hard, then it must pay an incentive compatible golden parachute, pWi ¡ c ¸ qWi:
Headquarter pays the least possible amount Wi = c
p¡q which again leaves some of the surplus
to the manager. It is easily veri¯ed that again headquarter can perfectly commit ex-ante to
liquidation by ±i = 1 for example.
The impact of e®ort not being observable is most clearly seen in the liquidation case where
production ends after the ¯rst period.16 In the liquidation case headquarter ¯nds it pro¯table
to induce a high e®ort if p(1 ¡ c
p¡q) ¸ q ()
p¡q
p ¸ c
p¡q : In contrast to the First Best case,
having the marginal bene¯t of a high e®ort exceed its marginal cost is no longer su±cient to
ensure a high e®ort. Instead, it must be that the ratio of marginal cost to marginal bene¯t must
be smaller than the relative impact of a high e®ort.
As in the First-Best case, we can show that the headquarter's continuation decision is ef-
¯cient. What changes when e®ort is not contractible is that it is more di±cult to induce a
divisional manager to work hard.
Proposition 2 When managerial e®ort is not contractible then a single division is continued
i® it has a positive NPV for the second period, °i® ¸ 1. The headquarter always induces a
high e®ort level from the divisional manager when ratio of the marginal cost of high e®ort to its




Proof. As in proposition 1
The second part of proposition 2 is a standard Moral-Hazard e®ect. The ¯rst part is sur-
prising since one often encounters models where Moral Hazard leads to ine±cient liquidation
(e.g. Bolton & Scharfstein [1996]). The di®erence is that headquarter can, as in First-Best
case, perfectly commit itself ex-ante and that headquarter pays the manager the same (in ex-
ante expectation) in both liquidation and continuation. Hence, the continuation decision is not
distorted.
To keep the subsequent analysis tractable we reduce the set of possible outcomes. First we
assume that the headquarter always wants to induce his divisional manager to work hard. Thus,
we strengthen assumption 1 to say:
15A high e®ort in the continuation case is more pro¯table for headquarter if p°i®(1 ¡
c






16Remember that there is a moral-hazard problem only in the ¯rst production period.
12Assumption 2 The ratio of the marginal cost of high e®ort to its marginal bene¯t is smaller




Second we assume that divisions always have a positive NPV for the second production
period.
Assumption 3 A division always has a positive Net Present Value for the second production
period: °i®>1 :
The consequence is that we are left with just one outcome when there is no internal capital
market. The manager always works hard in the ¯rst production period and his division is
continued for a second period if and only if it is successful. The Second-Best continuation
reward is ±SB
i = c
(p¡q)°i®. The manager's expected pro¯t is p c
p¡q and headquarter's pro¯t, i.e.
¯rm value, is




With these preliminaries we proceed to introduce our benchmark against which we measure
the value of the conglomerate.
3.3 The Stand-Alone benchmark: two ¯rms with one division each
In order to establish whether the ability to redistribute resources across divisions of a con-
glomerate creates or destroys value, we need a benchmark. As in the empirical literature, the
benchmark considers the value of portfolio of focused ¯rms.17 The previous section showed that
under assumptions 1, 2 and 3 a single ¯rm with one division is worth Vi = p°i® ¡ p c
p¡q: Since
we will only consider a conglomerate with two divisions i =1 ;2, we simplify °2 t o1a n d° 1=°:
Our divisions are identical so that we can assume without loss of generality that ° ¸ 1: The
parameter ° then describes the extra productivity of division 1 over division 2 in the second
production period.
The value of a portfolio of two independent ¯rms with one division each is




The ¯rst term in (4) describes the expected bene¯t from production in ¯rm/ division 1 over
two periods, the second describes the expected bene¯t from ¯rm/division 2 and the third term
describes the expected cost of inducing two divisional managers to exert a high e®ort.
Figure 2 illustrates the Stand-Alone benchmark in term of the overall productivity (®)a n d
the extra productivity of ¯rm/ division 1 (°). In the shaded area ° and ® are such that both
divisions have a positive NPV in the second production period, °® ¸ 1a n d®¸1 ;and division
1 is weakly more pro¯table, ° ¸ 1: The shaded area depicts the set of admissible parameter
values.
4 The conglomerate with an internal capital market
In this section we develop the model when there is an internal capital market, i.e. when head-
quarter can redistribute resources across its two divisions between the two production periods.
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Figure 2: The Stand-Alone benchmark
Adding an internal capital market has two consequences. First, we add strategies for the head-
quarter at the interim stage (this was illustrated in table 2). This means that if the headquarter
wants to continue only a successful division, i.e. replicate the Stand-Alone outcome, then it must
not only prefer continuation to liquidation but it must also prefer continuation to transferring
resources to another division. Hence there will be further constraints on the incentive contracts
headquarter can write.
Second, divisional managers will anticipate in the ¯rst period that there may be a redistribu-
tion of resources across divisions at the interim stage. A manager will have di®erent incentives
to exert high e®ort if he knows that he will be refunded only if he had success or if he knows
that he will be refunded no matter what or if he knows that he will never be refunded.
4.1 Autarkic divisions
We now explore the ¯rst consequence of adding an internal capital market, i.e. what are the
constraints headquarter's behavior at the interim stage? In order to avoid the second conse-
quence, i.e. the incentive e®ect on managers we ask: when can a conglomerate replicate the
Stand-Alone outcome and attain the benchmark value V SA? In replicating the Stand-Alone
outcome, each division will be autarkic and managers act independently so that their incentive
problem is identical to the Stand-Alone benchmark.
Given that the productivity of division 1 is common knowledge, headquarter may a prior
have an incentive to redistribute funds to division 1 which is more productive: By assuming for
a moment that headquarter keeps divisions autarkic, we explore a pure negative e®ect due to
the possibility of operating an internal capital market in this section.
If the conglomerate would never do worse with autarkic divisions there would be no point
in continuing our analysis of a conglomerate discount.
144.1.1 Implementation constraints
There are four contingencies that the headquarter can encounter at the interim stage. Either
both division succeeded, or just division 1 succeeded, or just division 2 succeeded or neither
division succeeded. The four cases correspond to the columns in table 2. In each case the
headquarter has various choices shown in the rows of the table. In order to implement a certain
redistribution policy, in this case the policy of no redistribution, the corresponding choice must
be the preferred one. So when both divisions succeeded then headquarter must prefer to continue
both divisions to the other three possible choices. Formally, it must be that
C1 + C2 ¸ C1 + L2 (5)
C1 + C2 ¸ C2 + L1 (6)
C1 + C2 ¸ L1 + L2 (7)
The ¯rst inequality says that headquarter must prefer to continue both divisions to just continue
division 1 and stop division 2. Similarly, the third inequality says that headquarter must prefer
to continue both divisions to stopping both.
When only division 1 succeeds then the headquarter must prefer to continue only division 1
so that
C1 ¸ L1 (8)
C1 ¸ C2 ¡ W1 (9)
The second inequality says that pro¯t from continuing division 1 must be weakly greater than
the pro¯t from continuing division 2 after compensating manager 1 whose division is stopped.18
When only division 2 succeeds then the headquarter must prefer to continue only division 2
so that
C2 ¸ L2 (10)
C2 ¸ C1 ¡ W2 (11)
In fact, we only need to consider the last four inequalities since together they imply the
¯rst three inequalities. What counts are those contingencies in which there is a potential for
redistribution, i.e. those in which only one division succeeds. Conditions (8) and (10) are the
continuation constraints that we also encountered in the previous section where there was no
internal capital market. What is new is the presence of the transfer constraints (9) and (11). If
headquarter wants to implement a policy of no redistribution at the interim stage, then the two
incentive contracts for the divisional managers, (±1;W 1)a n d( ± 2 ;W 2); must satisfy those four
constraints.
Even though divisions are autarkic, the mere possibility of transfers links the divisions via
the transfer constraints to be not too dissimilar. Since the net continuation pro¯t Ci is a function
of the incentive payment the manager receives when his division is continued, ±i; there is now
an important externality between the redistribution policy and incentive contracting.
18There are many more possible choices that we do not present explicitly. For example, the headquarter
could also stop both divisions and use the resources from division 1 to pay the manager of division 2 W2: Such
awkward possibilities are not optimal given our assumption of the positive Net Present Value of each division.
The headquarter always wants to continue successful divisions.
154.1.2 Managerial e®ort
Given that the headquarter does not redistribute resources at the interim stage, how does a
divisional manager behave in the ¯rst production period? In the absence of any redistribution
each division is autarkic so that each manager behaves exactly as in the case without any internal
capital market. For example, the manager of division 1 exerts a high e®ort only if it is pro¯table
for him to do so, i.e. when
p°®±1 ¡ c ¸ q°®±1 (12)
If the manager works hard then he incurs the cost of e®ort c and with probability p the division
succeeds so that he is paid a fraction ±i of the continuation pay-o® °®: If he does not work hard
then he does not incur the cost of e®ort but only gets the continuation payment with probability
q:19 Note that the performance of division 2 does not a®ect his incentives, (12) is identical to
(2) which described the incentive constraint for a ¯rm with one single division. The following
proposition summarizes the behavior of divisional managers when the internal capital market is
inactive.
Proposition 3 In a conglomerate with autarkic divisions the managerial incentive problem is
as in the Stand-Alone benchmark. It costs the same to induce a high e®ort from divisional
managers and they behave independently from each other.
Figure 3 illustrates the managerial incentive problem under autarky. It shows the e®ort of
both managers (e1;e 2) as a function of the payment ±i each manager receives if his division
is continued. The payment threshold beyond which they exert a high e®ort is the same as in
the Second-Best case: ±1 = c
(p¡q)°®;± 2 = c
(p¡q)®: Moreover, manager i's payment threshold is












Figure 3: Managerial e®orts as a function of continuation payements
4.1.3 When can a conglomerate replicate the Stand-Alone benchmark?
We are now ready to answer our initial question: when can a conglomerate replicate the Stand-
Alone benchmark, i.e. the outcome where there is no redistribution and attain the benchmark
19Given assumptions 2 and 3 we can focus on the case where the headquarter wants the manager to work hard
and where the headquarter wants to continue divisions i® they were successful.









C1(±1) ¸ C2(±2) ¡ W1







The headquarter's objective function consists of four terms that re°ect i) the four contin-
gencies at the interim stage, ii) the transfer decision taken at that stage and iii) the managerial
e®ort level in the ¯rst production period. For example the second term p(1 ¡ p)C1(±1)i st h e
expected pro¯t in the case that only division 1 succeeds, that division 1 is continued and that












The congomerate does as well as
the Stand-Alone benchmark
The congomerate does worse than
the Stand-Alone benchmark.
The manager of the more pro¯table
division is over compensated
Figure 4: A conglomerate with autarkic divisions can never do better than the Stand-Alone
benchmark
17The ¯rst four constraints re°ect the headquarter's transfer policy, here no-redistribution,
at the interim stage. The last two constraints are the incentive constraints for the divisional
managers. To attain the benchmark value V SA the headquarter must induce a high e®ort level
from both managers with the e±cient, i.e. Second Best, continuation payment ±1 = c
(p¡q)°®
and ±2 = c
(p¡q)®: Given that headquarter optimally maximizes the "golden parachute" for both
managers, W1 = W2 =1 ;the transfer constraint then gives the following result.
Proposition 4 A conglomerate that operates a no-transfer policy can only do as well a corre-
sponding portfolio of Stand-Alone ¯rms, i.e. attain the benchmark value V SA; i® the hetero-
geneity across divisions is not too strong ° · 1+ 1
®:
Figure 4 illustrates the result. Note that for a conglomerate with autarkic divisions it
become more di±cult to do as well as the Stand-Alone benchmark when the overall productivity
increases.
The proposition illustrates the negative side of having an internal capital market. There
exists a tension between the incentives for divisional managers and the incentives for the head-
quarter to redistribute funds. Should the headquarter want to keep the division separate and
commit to a no-transfer policy then he must obtain a similar net continuation pro¯t from both
divisions. Otherwise, there is an incentive for redistribution should the more pro¯table division
fails. But since net continuation pro¯ts depend on the incentive payment to managers, there
is now a strong restriction on the incentive payments the headquarter can make. In order to
attain the benchmark value of 2 stand-alone divisions, each manager must be induced to work
hard. If now for example division 1 is a lot more pro¯table, i.e. °>1+ 1
®;then manager 1 must
be paid more than the e±cient, Second Best, continuation payment ±SB
1 = c
(p¡q)°® in order to
satisfy the transfer constraints. But since more is paid to manager 1 than is necessary to induce
a high e®ort, not because the headquarter induces the manager of the more pro¯table division
to work harder but in order to make the no-transfer policy credible, there is a loss in ¯rm value.
4.1.4 Full characterization with autarkic divisions
Note that proposition 4 only tells us when the conglomerate, by choosing not use the inter-
nal capital market, can do as well as the portfolio of two ¯rms with one division each. The
proposition is not a full characterization of the optimization program nor does the optimization
program fully describe the no-transfer case.
As we have seen in proposition 4, when the headquarter wants to implement the no-transfer
policy, it must be optimal to re¯nance the less productive division when this division is the
sole division that succeeds. In other words, the net continuation value of division 2 should be
greater than the net continuation value of division 1 net of the payment to manager 2 if his
division is successful but not re¯nanced. The relevant transfer constraint of the problem is the
second one: C2 ¸ C1 ¡ W2. To satisfy this constraint, the headquarter has three possibilities.
First, he could increase the payment to manager 2 when his successful division is liquidated.
But the the headquarter cannot pay more than what he has. W2 cannot exceed the liquidation
value of division 2. Second, the headquarter could decrease the net continuation pro¯t of the
most pro¯table division by paying the manager more than what he needs to do a high e®ort.
Increasing ±1 above ±SB
1 decreases the pro¯t left to the headquarter in division 1 and hence
makes continuation of this division less attractive. Last, the headquarter could increase the net
continuation value of the less productive division by decreasing the payment ±2 to the manager.
But a decrease in ±2 implies that the incentive constraint of the second manager will no longer
18be satis¯ed and the manager of the less productive division will not work hard. And hence, if
the headquarter decides to decrease ±2, it will be set at its lowest possible value: ±2 =0 .
When the conglomerate does not have the benchmark value V SA, if the headquarter wants to
implement the no-transfer policy at the interim stage, he should either over-compensate the ¯rst
manager or rely on a low e®ort from the second manager (or both). In appendix A, we compare
the bene¯ts, in term of conglomerate value, of these strategies and the results are summarized
in a proposition:
Proposition 5 Under autarky, the headquarter induces both managers to work hard if either the
overall productivity is su±ciently high, ® ¸ 2( c
p¡q)(
p
p¡q), or if the extra productivity of division
1 is su±ciently low, ° · (1 +
p¡q
p )+( 1¡ c
p ¡ q)1
®:If not, then only the manager of the more
pro¯table division works hard.20
Figure 5 illustrates the proposition.
We need to explain why the headquarter does better with a low e®ort from manager 2 when
there is little overall pro¯tability but a lot of heterogeneity. In that case there is big di®erence
in the gross continuation value between division 1 and division 2. If both managers were to
work hard then only way to satisfy the transfer constraint is to give away the extra pro¯tability
of division 1 to its manager.21 Given that division 1 is quite a bit more pro¯table than division
2, giving away the extra pro¯tability of division 1 is very costly. A cheaper way is to have the
manager of division 2 work little. True, this means that division 2 will be less often continued
but that division is not very pro¯table, relative to division 1, anyway. What matters more for
headquarter is that since manager 2 is no longer given a share of his division, the net value of
division 2 increases which in turn eases the transfer constraint and allows headquarter to pro¯t
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Figure 5: Divisional manager's e®ort uner autarky
20The corresponding incentive contracts can be found in the derivation of the solution in appendix A.
21The headquarter cannot raise the net value of division 2 by reducing ±2 since its manager must be induced
to work hard.
194.2 Redistribution
Proposition 4 shows that the conglomerate with an inactive internal capital market always does
worse than the corresponding portfolio of Stand-Alone ¯rms if the productivity di®erence across
divisions is large. In other words, the previous section showed a pure negative aspect of an
internal capital market.
In this section we consider the case when the headquarter does redistribute resources at
the interim stage towards the more pro¯table division, i.e. when there is an active internal
capital market.22 Again, we proceed backwards in the sequence of events by considering ¯rst
the headquarter's continuation and transfer constraints at the interim stage between production
periods and then considering the manager's incentive problem in the ¯rst production period.
4.2.1 Implementation constraints
By redistributing resources to division 1, headquarter now e®ectively implements a policy of
always continuing division 1. When both divisions succeeded then headquarter must want to
continue both divisions.23 Hence, conditions (5) to (7) must hold just as in the no-transfer case.
When only division 1 succeeded then again no transfer are needed since the division is continued
with its own resources. Division 2 has failed and is stopped. Thus, conditions (8) and (9) now
apply too.
But when only division 2 succeeded then there is a new situation. Now headquarter needs
to transfer the resources form the successful division 2 to the unsuccessful division 1. For this
transfer policy between the production stages to be optimal it must be that
C1 ¡ W2 ¸ 1 ¡ W2 (14)
C1 ¡ W2 ¸ C2 (15)
The ¯rst inequality says that it must be more pro¯table to stop division 2 and continue
division 1 than to just stop division 2.24 The second inequality says that it must be more
pro¯table to stop division 2 and continue division 1 than to continue division 2. Note that if the
two continuation constraints (10) and (14) as well as the transfer constraint (15) are satis¯ed
then the remaining 4 constraints hold automatically.
However, limited liability needs to be respected. Headquarter must set the payment when
stopping division 2 to zero, W2 =0 ;since there is only 1 unit of resources available when only
division 2 succeeded. And that unit is used to re¯nance the failed division 1. Hence there is
nothing left to compensate the manager of division 2, a division that is stopped although it has
succeeded.25
The continuation and transfer constraints then simply are
C1 ¸ C2 ¸ 1
In a conglomerate that reallocated resources to the more productive division the net contin-
uation value of the more pro¯table division must be bigger than the net continuation value of
22Headquarter never wants to redistribute funds to division 2 since that division is the less pro¯table one.
23Stopping division 2 in that case cannot be optimal since there are enough resources to continue both divisions
with both have a positive NPV.
24We do not distinguish between a Wi that is paid because i's resources are used elsewhere in the conglomerate
or not.
25This is for simplicity only. What is important is that in a capital budgeting process choices must be made.
Besides, headquarter would want to reduce W2 as much as possible anyway.
20the less pro¯table division. In addition, the net continuation value of both divisions should be
greater than their liquidation value. This means that, there will be ine±cient continuation (all
the NPV projects will not be continued) if the manager of the less pro¯table division is induced
to work hard.
4.2.2 Managerial e®ort
Whereas under a no-transfer policy both managers behave independently from each other there
is now an externality between them. Whereas under a no-transfer policy any manager that
works hard gets the continuation payment with probability p2 + p(1 ¡ p)=p; this is no longer
true when the headquarter always re¯nances the more pro¯table division.
Incentives for the manager of the more pro¯table division The manager of division
1 is always re¯nanced so that also gets a share of the surplus when his division fails but the
other division succeeds. The probability of him receiving the continuation payment ±1 therefore
depends not only on his own e®ort but also on the e®ort of the other manager. If manager 2
works hard then manager 1 receives his continuation payment ±1 with probability p+(1¡p)pif
he himself works hard and with probability q +(1¡q)pif he does not work hard. A high e®ort
by manager 1, eh




(1 ¡ p)(p ¡ q)®°
(16)
If manager 2 does not work hard then manager 1 receives his continuation payment with
probability p +( 1¡p ) qif he works hard and with probability q +( 1¡q ) qif he himself works
little. Thus, eh




(1 ¡ q)(p ¡ q)®°
(17)
There two e®ects to note. First, it is now harder to induce the manager of the more pro¯table
division to work hard (compare (16) and (17) with (12)). His incentive to work hard is weakened
since he knows that even if his division fails more often due to his lower e®ort, his division is
still continued due to the transfer of funds from the other division. Second, it is more di±cult
to induce manager 1 to work hard when manager 2 works hard too. This mirrors the ¯rst
e®ect. If manager 2 works hard then manager 1 is more often re¯nanced when his division fails.
Due to manager 2's hard work, division 2 succeeds more often which means that the funds for
redistribution are available more often.
Incentives for the manager of the less pro¯table division The manager of division
2 is only re¯nanced when both divisions succeed so that the probability of him receiving the
continuation share ±2 also depends not only on his own e®ort but also on the e®ort of manager
1. If manager 1 works hard then manager 2 receives ±2 with probability p2 when he also works
hard and with probability pq if he does not work hard. So eh






If manager 1 does not work hard then manager 2 receives ±2 with probability pq if he works
hard and with probability q2 if he also does not work hard. So eh






21Again there are two e®ects at play. As in the case of the manager of division 1 it is also
more di±cult to induce the manager of division 2. But the reason is a di®erent one. Manager 2
simply gets paid the continuation payment less often. The second e®ect con¯rms the di®erence
since when the other manager works hard, it is now easier to induce manager 2 to work hard
too.
We summarize the impact of redistribution on the Moral-Hazard problem in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6 In a conglomerate that reallocates resources towards the more productive divi-
sion it is more di±cult to induce both divisional managers. Moreover, the impact of redistribution
is asymmetric. On the one hand, it is more di±cult to induce the manager of the more pro¯table
division to work hard when the manager of the less pro¯table division works hard. On the other
hand, it is easier to induce the manager of the less pro¯table division to work hard when the
manager of the more pro¯table division works hard.
Figure 6 illustrates that i) the Moral-Hazard problem now is more severe than under a no-

















Figure 6: Managerial e®orts as a function of continuation payements when division 1 is always
re¯nanced
The best pair of incentive payments, ±1 and ±2; that induce both managers to work hard









We call them the Third-Best incentive contracts.
224.2.3 Redistributing towards the more pro¯table division and having both man-
agers work hard
We now describe the case when headquarter wants to implement a transfer policy by which the
more pro¯table division is always re¯nanced and when headquarter induces both managers to
work hard. We compare this solution with the stand alone benchmark and we introduce latter
the full solution to the conglomerate problem.















Note how this program compare to the optimization program when headquarter wants au-
tarkic divisions. The third term in the objective function changes to re°ect that when division 1
fails but division 2 succeeds then it is division 1 that is continued. The continuation constraints
no longer include the "golden parachutes" W1 and W2. There is only one transfer constraint
but again, the "golden parachutes" are missing (due to limited liability). Finally, the incentive
constraints show that it is more di±cult to induce managers to work hard.
The following proposition shows when a solution to the optimization program exists.
Proposition 7 The headquarter can commit to always transfer resources towards the more
productive division and induce both managers to work hard if the overall productivity is high









1¡p then an additional condition is that the




1¡p): If the extra productivity of
division 1 is low, °<1+ c
p ¡ q
2 p ¡ 1
p (1¡p); then the manager of division 2 is overcompensated.
Proof. In the appendix
The various constraints are illustrated in ¯gure 7. The ¯rst thing to note is that there is
ine±cient continuation, i.e. the Net Present Value rule does not hold. If the overall productivity
is low then it is not possible to implement the transfer policy with both managers working hard.
The ine±ciency comes from the fact that since the "golden parachute" is paid to manager 2
even if headquarter continues division 1, the "golden parachute" can no longer serve to commit
to continuation. Next, we see that the manager of the less pro¯table division must be overcom-
pensated if the extra pro¯tability of division 1 is low. In that case, the transfer constraint is
binding. In order to reduce the net continuation value of division 2, its manager receives a larger
incentive payment than what is needed to induce him to work hard. Note how this overcom-
pensation feeds into the continuation constraint. Since manager 2 must receive a large payment


















Both manager receive their
third best contract
The manager of the less productive
division is over compensated
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Figure 7: When can corporate headquarter reallocate to the more productive division with both
managers working hard?
4.2.4 What are the costs and bene¯ts of an active internal capital market?
We can now discuss the costs and bene¯ts of running an e±cient internal capital. The Stand-
Alone benchmark value V SA was given in equation (4). The value of a conglomerate that always
re¯nances the more pro¯table division and where both divisional managers work hard is at most:
V 1








The ¯rst term is the expected bene¯t from continuing division 1, the second term is the expected
bene¯t from continuing division 2, the third term is the expected cost of inducing manager 2 to
work hard26 and the last term is the expected cost of inducing manager 1 to work hard. When
is V 1



















The term on the left-hand is the net bene¯t of reallocating resources to the more productive
division. With probability (1¡p)p we have the situation that there are no resources in the more
productive division and there are resources in the less productive division. If the resources are
left where they are then gross pro¯ts are ®: If they are reallocated towards the more productive
division then gross pro¯ts are °®: Hence the net bene¯t of reallocation is (1 ¡ p)p(° ¡ 1)®:
The term on the right-hand side is the net cost of reallocation. In the Stand{Alone case, the
manager of the more pro¯table ¯rm obtains his share ±SB
1 with probability p: Now this manager
26Which is the same as in the Stand-Alone case. The manager is paid more but less often, and in expectation,
the cost of a high e®ort in the less productive division is the same.
24is paid more often (he receives his share with probability p+p(1¡p)). In addition, he must be
paid a larger share ±TB
1 since, knowing that he receives his share also when has failed provided
the other manager succeeds, reallocation weakens his incentives.
Rewriting the cost-bene¯t inequality in terms of the extra productivity of division 1, °; we
can state the next result.
Proposition 8 By redistributing towards the more productive division and inducing both man-
agers to work hard, the conglomerate can do better than the Stand-Alone benchmark if the extra





(1¡p)2. But it can only do better
when both managers get their third best incentive contract.
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p (1¡p) (the manager of the second division
receives more than ±TB









p2 ¡ p + 1
2 > 0. Which is true for all p:
4.2.5 Redistribution toward the more productive division: complete solution
The solution with transfers and two high e®orts has three additional problems compared to
the stand alone benchmark. First, there is over compensation of the manager of the most
productive division. It is more di±cult to motivate this manager to exert a high e®ort, and
hence, his expected payment is higher than in the stand alone case. Second, the NPV rule does
not hold. The continuation decision is ine±cient when both managers work hard. For low values
of ®, even if the divisions have a positive NPV, the headquarter prefers to liquidate them and
collect the liquidation value of the divisions. Third, the manager of the less productive division
may be over-compensated, if the di®erential in productivity (°)i sl o w .
For all this reasons, nothing guarantee that the headquarter prefers that both managers
work hard when he transfers resources to the most productive division. Indeed, the other e®ort
combinations may partially solve the problems of the high e®ort solution.
If the manager of the less productive division does not work hard, the headquarter could set
±2 at its lowest value. The continuation value of the second division is then ®, and the divisions
are continued if C2 = ® ¸ 1, which is precisely the NPV rule. A low e®ort in the less productive
division is a solution to the ine±cient continuation problem.
But, if in addition to a low e®ort by manager 2, the manager 1 exerts a high e®ort, it changes
the incentive constraint of the manager 1 and there is still over compensation.
If the manager of the most productive division does not work hard, the problems of higher
expected payment to this manager vanishes.
When the manager of the less productive division makes a high e®ort, even if the share in
the surplus he requires to make this e®ort is higher than ±SB
2 , his expected payment is the same
as in the stand-alone case.
Therefore, when the headquarter prefers that only one manager works hard, the high e®ort
will be exerted by the manager 2 when it is possible.
A low e®ort by the manager of the less productive division restores the NPV rule. And
a low e®ort by the manager of the most productive division suppress the problem of higher
expected payments. In appendix B, we describe the optimal contract for all the possible e®ort
combinations and compare them. The optimal e®ort combination is represented in ¯gure 8.
From the picture and the discussion in the appendix, we can draw the following conclusions.
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Figure 8: Redistribution: complete solution
is not always the optimal e®ort combination. The corporate headquarter has two reasons to
lower the amount of e®ort. For low values of ®, there will be less e®ort to preserve the NPV
rule. For low values of °, when the bene¯ts of redistribution are not so high, the amount of
e®ort is lowered to suppress the problem of higher payment to manager 1.
5 Conglomerate vs. Stand-Alone: is there a discount?
Now that we have described the complete solution to the conglomerate problem, when the
headquarter does not transfer and when it transfers, we can compare the conglomerate solution
with the value of the portfolio of single division ¯rms. This is the object of the next proposition:
Proposition 9 It exists a function °¤(®), such that:
(i) for all (°;®) such that °>° ¤ ( ® ) , the conglomerate has a strictly higher value than V SA,i f
the headquarter transfers resources to the most productive division.
(ii) for all (°;®) such that °¤(®) >°>1+ 1
®, the conglomerate has a strictly lower value than
V SA, whatever the redistributive policy.
(iii) for all (°;®) such that °<1+ 1
®, the conglomerate has the same value than V SA, if the
headquarter does not transfer resources.
Proof. In the appendix.
Proposition 9 is illustrated in ¯gure 9.
This proposition which is the central result of the paper deserves some comments. As we
already explained, an active redistributive policy inside the conglomerate has bene¯ts as well as
costs. The bene¯ts are obvious, as the conglomerate headquarter could select the most e±cient
project when resources are scare. The costs have two sources: the interdepandance between the
e®ort decisions of the managers when the headquarter decides to always re¯nance one division
(this was explained in proposition 6) and the necessity of making the transfer policy ad-interim
e±cient. The costs of an active internal capital market take the form of either a lower e®ort by
26manager(s) or a higher payment to manager(s) (or both). To create more value than comparable
single division ¯rms, the bene¯ts of redistribution should exceed the costs.
What proposition 9 shows, is that if ®° is large enough, indeed larger than °¤(®), the
bene¯ts of an active internal capital market exceeds the costs and the conglomerate creates
more value than single division ¯rms. Consequently, when the bene¯ts are not large enough,
the conglomerate has a lower value than independent ¯rms, unless, the conglomerate is able to
replicate the stand alone solution which is the case for low values of °.
We cannot conclude that conglomerate systematically discount. What our paper shows, is
that there costs in term of agency costs, of running an active internal capital market but there
are also bene¯ts. Depending on the conglomerate heterogeneity among divisions performances,
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The congomerate value is V SA
Conglomerate discount
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Figure 9: When does a conglomerate create or destroy value?
This kind of heterogeneity in the performance of conglomerate is consistent with the empirical
evidences. Berger and Ofek, even if they found that conglomerates in average have a lower value
than stand alone ¯rms, some conglomerates perform better while the other do worse.
If there is one division that is a lot more pro¯table, there is a conglomerate premium if the
headquarter uses the conglomerate resources to re¯nance that division whatever its performance
in the past. If the productivity of the divisions is similar, the headquarter prefers that each
division relies only on its resources and the conglomerate may eventually replicate the stand alone
solution. It is only when the heterogeneity is not too big nor too small that the conglomerate
discounts even if it re¯nances the more pro¯table division.
6 Conclusion
The aim of our paper was to explain that conglomerates may discount with a model that a)
does not assume that managerial pay-o® is exogenous and b) does not assume ine±cient cross-
subsidisation. It is especially the second assumption that has recently be criticised on empirical
grounds.
27Our starting point was that an internal capital markets allows headquarter to make e±cient
use of limited resources. The main problem that headquarter faces is that those funds may be
found in the "wrong" place. By this we mean that due to exogenous shocks, less productive
divisions may turn out to be rich in resources while more productive divisions may turn out to
be poor in resources. Managers' anticipation that headquarter has an incentive to reallocate
funds creates new agency costs in a conglomerate. Moreover, headquarter must indeed ¯nd it
optimal between production periods to reallocate funds, i.e. there are interim continuation and
transfer constraints. On the whole there is a subtle interaction between the agency cost and
the interim constraints that results in higher payments to managers and/or lower e®ort in the
conglomerate.
Our main conclusion is that a conglomerate discount exists and, what is noteworthy, that it
exists when the productivity di®erence between divisions is neither too large nor too small. But
note that we do not have a theory of diversi¯cation or corporate focus since i) our divisions are
independent and ii) they are technologically identical but for their productivity.
Although we examine explicitly the role of managerial incentive contracts our analysis is still
limited in that respect. We do not attempt to derive the optimal incentive scheme that would
minimize the costs that we have identi¯ed. For example, an optimal contract would not only pay
the manager a fraction of the continuation pro¯ts of his own division but it would also specify a
payment out of the continuation pro¯ts from other divisions. It is also conceivable for divisional
managers to hold option contracts on the value of the total ¯rm. These contracts would pay
them something even if their own division has been liquidated. Furthermore, we saw that the
agency cost of reallocation is due to the fact that the manager of the more productive division is
paid more and that he is paid more often. An optimal contract would then try to take something
away from him, for example if his division is continued with the resources of the other. In other
words, we would have a transfer price ¿ paid out of the pro¯t of division 1 to division 2 when
division 1 is continued with the resources from the successful division 2. To lower the payment
to the manager of the most pro¯table division, the headquarter wants to set the transfer price
as high as possible: ¿ = ®°. With such a transfer price, the incentive constraints of the ¯rst
manager will be similar to the constraints faced by the manager of a stand-alone ¯rm. But the
manager of the less productive division will be paid more than in the stand alone case, as he will
get ±2¿ = ±2®° when he is the sole who succeeds in ¯rst period. In other word, introducing a
transfer price is not enough to suppress the agency costs associated with the re¯nancing policy27,
even if it could reduce the set of parameters where the conglomerate discounts.
What we have shown is that we do not need to resort to "private bene¯ts" (or stealing)
models with their ad-hoc assumptions about the nature of the con°ict between headquarter
and divisional managers if we want to explain the apparent conglomerate discount. Our paper
therefore also touches on two more fundamental questions about which the existing theoretical
literature remains largely silent. The ¯rst question is: in what respect are internal capital
market really di®erent than external capital markets. We showed that headquarter that operates
an internal capital market can do both, redistribute funds and take into account incentive
distortions. An external ¯nancier could probably not modify the incentive contracts within the
¯rm. The second question is: why do ¯rms merge and break-up? Models like Rajan & al [2000]
only explain the costs of running a conglomerate. According to their analysis, all conglomerates
should be dismantled. Our paper shows that that we can have conglomerates doing better or
doing worse or doing as well as a Stand-Alone benchmark. It all depends on the relationship of
the relative to the absolute productivity of divisions.
27The problem of lower e®ort due to ine±cient re¯nancing is still present with a transfer price.
28A Full characterization of the no-transfer case
In the no transfer case, to each e®orts combination corresponds a pair of incentive constraints.
These constraints (one for each manager) are constructed from picture 6 and are similar to those










IC1 ±1 ¸ c
(p¡q)®° ±1 · c
(p¡q)®° ±1 ¸ c
(p¡q)®° ±1 · c
(p¡q)®°
IC2 ±2 ¸ c
(p¡q)® ±2 ¸ c
(p¡q)® ±2 · c
(p¡q)® ±2 · c
(p¡q)®
In addition to these incentive constraints that determine the e®ort level, the following transfer
constraint should be satis¯ed:
C1(±1) ¸ C1(±2) ¡ W2 (9)
C2(±2) ¸ C1(±1) ¡ W1 (11)
As we explained in the text, we could set W1 = W2 = 1 to satisfy the continuation constraints
and ease the transfer constraints. Among these two constraints, only the second one (11) will





A.1 Both managers exert high e®ort
We must solve the following optimization program
max
±1;±2
p2(C1(±1)+C 2( ± 2)) + p(1 ¡ p)C1(±1)+( 1¡p ) pC2(±2)
subject to: (IC1), (IC2), (11)
It is obvious that ±2 should be set at its lowest possible value (given by (IC2)). Manager
1's contract depends on whether the second transfer constraint binds or not. If not he gets his
second-best contract too: ±1 = c
(p¡q)°®: This is possible as long as ° · 1+ 1
®:If the constraint




Lemma 1 Under autarky, corporate headquarter can always induce both managers to work hard.
The manager of the less pro¯table division always receives his second best contract, ±2 = c
(p¡q)®:
If the relative pro¯tability is low, ° · 1+ 1
®;then corporate headquarter can pay manager 1 his
second best contracts too, ±1 = c
(p¡q)°®: If not then manager 1 must receive a lager share and




When the manager 1's contract is given by (IC1), the conglomerate's value is V SA. Otherwise,
the value is p(2® +1 )¡2 p c
( p ¡ q)
A.2 Only manager 2 exerts high e®ort
We have the following optimization program
max
±1;±2
qp(C1(±1)+C 2( ± 2)) + q(1 ¡ p)C1(±1)+( 1¡q) pC2(±2)
29subject to: (IC1), (IC2), (11)
We do not have to solve the entire optimization program since this case is always dominated
by the case when both managers work hard. To see this note that if °>1+ 1
® t h e ni ti s
impossible to satisfy the incentive constraints and the transfer constraint. Thus a solution only
exists when ° · 1+ 1
® but then the corporate headquarter can induce both managers to work
hard with the second-best contracts, which means that the conglomerate does as well as the
Stand-Alone benchmark. Under autarky, the conglomerate can never do better, and certainly
not with the manager of the more pro¯table division not working hard.
Lemma 2 Under autarky, corporate headquarter never ¯nds it optimal to induce only the man-
agers of the less pro¯table division to work hard.
A.2.1 Only manager 1 exerts high e®ort
The optimization program now becomes
max
±1;±2;W1;W2
pq(C1(±1)+C 2( ± 2)) + p(1 ¡ q)C1(±1)+( 1¡p ) qC2(±2)
subject to: (IC1), (IC2), (11)
it is immediate that ±2 will equal zero. If the second transfer constraint is slack, ±1 = c
(p¡q)°®:
This case is possible when °<1+ 1
®(1 + c
p¡q): If ° ¸ 1+ 1
®(1 + c
p¡q) then the second transfer
constraint binds and ±1 =1¡1
°¡ 1
°®:
Lemma 3 Under autarky, corporate headquarter can always induce only the manager of the
more pro¯table division to work hard. The manager of the less pro¯table division always receives
his second best contract, ±2 =0 :If the relative pro¯tability is low, ° · 1+ 1
®(1 + c
p¡q); then
corporate headquarter can pay manager 1 his second best contracts too, ±1 = c
(p¡q)°®: If not then
manager 1 must receive a lager share and gets a third best contract, ±1 =1¡1
°¡ 1
°®:
When the managerial contract is (±1;± 2)=( c
( p ¡ q ) ®°;0), the conglomerate has a value p®°+q®¡
pc
(p¡q). When ±1 is given by the transfer constraint, the conglomerate value is p(1 + ®)+q®.




q2(C1(±1)+C 2( ± 2)) + q(1 ¡ q)C1(±1)+( 1¡q) qC2(±2)
subject to:(IC1), (IC2), (11)
Again, we do not have to solve the entire optimization program since this case is always
dominated by the case when only manager 1 works hard. To see this note that if °>1+ 1
®(1+
c
p¡q) then it is impossible to satisfy the incentive constraints and the second transfer constraint.
Thus a solution only exists when ° · 1+ 1
®(1 + c
p¡q) but then the corporate headquarter can
induce manager 1 to work hard with the second-best contract. Since we assumed that high
managerial e®ort is desirable in a second-best situation, the conglomerate can never do better
with a low e®ort from manager 1.
Lemma 4 Under autarky, corporate headquarter never ¯nds it optimal to induce both managers
to not work hard.
30A.2.3 Comparing pro¯ts
We have established a) that the manager of the more pro¯table division always works hard and
b) that the manager of the less pro¯table division always receives his second best contract. The
question then is: when does corporate headquarter ¯nd it pro¯table to induce both managers to
work hard subject to the constraint that it must sometimes o®er third-best incentive contracts.
When ° · 1+ 1
® then it is possible to induce both managers to work hard with second-best
contracts and headquarter cannot do better than that. But when °>1+ 1
® then it must o®er
a third-best contract to the manager of the more pro¯table division. The question then is: is it
cheaper to have the manager of the less pro¯table division not work hard?
When 1 + 1
® <°·1+ 1
®(1 + c
p¡q) then we compare the value of the conglomerate when
manager 1 works hard due to a third-best contract with the value when manager 1 works little
due to second-best contract. The former exceeds the latter when
p(2® +1 )¡2 p
c
p¡q
¸ p°® + q®¡p
c
p¡q









When 1 + 1
®(1 + c
p¡q) <°then we compare the value of the conglomerate when manager
1 works hard due to a third-best contract with the value when manager 1 works little due to
third-best contract. The former exceeds the latter when
p(2® +1 )¡2 p
c
p¡q






B Full characterization of the transfer case
The aim of this appendix is to describe the complete solution to the conglomerate problem when
the corporate headquarter always re¯nance the most productive division.
The transfer policy is ad-interim e±cient if the following continuation and transfer constraints
are satis¯ed:
C2 ¸ 1 , ±2 · 1 ¡
1
®






In addition to these constraints, to each e®orts combination corresponds a pair of incentive








IC1 ±1 · c
(1¡p)(p¡q)®° ±1 ¸ c
(1¡q)(p¡q)®° ±1 · c
(p¡q)(1¡q)®°
IC2 ±2 ¸ c
q(p¡q)® ±2 · c
p(p¡q)® ±2 · c
q(p¡q)®
There are four possible e®ort combinations that should be envisaged in turn.
31B.1 Both managers exert a high e®ort
This case is described in proposition 7 The value of the conglomerate with two high e®orts is
V HH




(1¡p)(p¡q) if ° ¸ 1+
(2p¡1)c





B.2 Only manager 1 exerts a high e®ort
We have the following optimization program:
max
±1;±2
(p +( 1¡p ) q) C 1+qpC2
subject to: IC1, IC2 and the continuation and transfer constraint.
It is immediate that ±1 is set at its lowest possible value given by IC1.I f°is greater than
1+ c
(1¡q)(p¡q)®, ±2 can be set at its lowest possible value (= 0). Otherwise, ±2 is set to satisfy the
transfer constraint: ±2 =1¡°+ c
(1¡q)(p¡q)®. But at this value, the constraint IC2 is satis¯ed
only if ° ¸ 1+ c
( p ¡ q ) ®
p + q ¡ 1
(1¡q)p and the continuation constraint is satis¯ed if: ° ¸ 1
® + c
(1¡q)(p¡q)®
(which is a weaker condition). So IC2 determines the validity set of the solution.
Lemma 5 It is possible to re¯nance the most productive division and having only the manager
of the most productive division working hard if ° ¸ 1+ c
( p ¡ q ) ®
p + q ¡ 1
(1¡q)p. The manager of the
most productive division receives ±1 = c
(1¡q)(p¡q)®°. The manager of the less productive division
receives ±2 =0if the relative productivity is high, ° ¸ 1+ c
(1¡q)(p¡q)®. Otherwise, the manager
of division 2 receives ±2 =1¡°+ c
(1¡q)(p¡q)®.
In the ¯rst case, the conglomerate worths: V HL




2 =( p+q ) ®° ¡
(p+q)c
(1¡p)(p¡q)in the second.
B.3 Only manager 2 exerts a high e®ort
The optimization program is similar to the previous one except the incentive constraints. The
solution is:
Lemma 6 It is possible to re¯nance the most productive division and having only the manager
of the less productive division working hard if ® ¸ 1+ c
q ( p ¡ q ). The managers receive shares
(±1;± 2)=( 0 ; c
( p ¡ q ) q®) and the conglomerate has value: V LH =( q+p¡pq)®° + qp®¡
pc
(p¡q).
In this solution, the cost of e®ort is the same as in the stand alone case but it is not
implementable if ® is not large enough (because of the continuation problem).
B.4 Both managers do a low e®ort
max
±1;±2
(q +( 1¡q) q) C 1+q 2C 2
subject to: IC1, IC2 and the continuation and transfer constraint. The solution is:
Lemma 7 It is always possible to re¯nance the most productive division and having both man-
agers not working hard. The managers receive shares (±1;± 2)=( 0 ;0) and the conglomerate has
value: V LL =( 2 q¡q 2) ®° + q2®.
32B.5 Comparing pro¯ts
In this section, we derive the optimal e®ort combination that would be selected by the corporate
owner when he always re¯nances the most productive division.






Assumption 5 q = 1
2
With these assumptions, we reduce the number of parameter to three: p (or c), ® and °.
We divide the parameter space in three di®erent regions: in region 1, the solutions with a
high e®ort from the manager of the less productive division does not exist. Region corresponds
to the values of ® 2 [1;1+
Ã
p]. In region 2, who corresponds to ® 2 [1+
Ã
p;1+2 Ã], the solution
with only the manager of the less productive division working hard does not exist.28 And ¯nally
region 3 corresponds to ® ¸ 1+2 Ã. In this region, all solutions exist.
Let's start with region 3 and establish a ¯rst result:
Lemma 8 When it exists, the solution with a high in division 2 only dominates both the solution
with a high e®ort in division 1 only and the solution with two low e®orts.
Proof. The solution with a high e®ort in division 1 is dominated because the expected costs
of a high e®ort in division 1 is greater than in division 2: (3
2p +1 ) Ã>p Ã
Assumption 2 implies that V LL <VLH for all ® ¸ 1.
In region 3, we are left with two possible solutions: either two high e®orts or a high e®ort
in division 2 only. To these solutions corresponds three values of the conglomerate: V HH
1 ;VHH
2
and V LH. Pairwise comparisons between these values give:
V HH
1 ¸ VHH


















(2p ¡ 1)(1 + p)
®(1 ¡ p)(3p ¡ 1)
(23)




2p2 > 1+2Ã.F o r®2[1+2Ã; ~ ®],










®(1¡p)(3p¡1); in the other cases, a high e®ort from manager 2 is e±cient.
Now consider regions 1 and 2. In these regions, three solutions exists and it corresponds to
¯ve conglomerate value. We could reduce the possible conglomerate value to three by establish-
ing that:
28We have to exclude from regions 1 and 2 the lower values of ° for which the solutions do not exist due to the
binding transfer constraint. As we will see in lemma 9, in these cases, the optimal e®ort combination is two low
e®orts.
33Lemma 9 For ® · 1+2 Ã,
(i) when with two high e®orts the conglomerate value is V HH
2 , the headquarter does better with
two low e®orts.
(ii) when with one high e®ort in the ¯rst division the conglomerate value is V HL
2 , the headquarter
does better with two low e®orts.
Proof. (i) V LL ¸ V HH





8p¡3. With two high e®orts, the conglomerate
value is V HH
2 if ° · 1+
(2p¡1)Ã
(1¡p)p®. Given our assumptions, ° · 1+
(2p¡1)Ã
(1¡p)p® and ® · 1+2Ãimplies
V LL ¸ V HH
2 .
(ii) V LL ¸ V HL





(1¡p)(4p¡1). With the sole manager 1 working hard, the
conglomerate value is V HL
2 if ° · 1+
2 Ã
®. Given our assumptions, ° · 1+
2 Ã
® and ® · 1+2 Ã
implies V LL ¸ V HL
2 .
In region 1, we are left with two conglomerate values to compare. The solution with a high
e®ort in the ¯rst division dominates two low e®orts if:
V HL




In region 2, the conglomerate has three possible values. Pairwise comparisons between the
conglomerate value (V HH
1 ;VLL;VHL
1 ) gives the following results:
V HH
























All these three curves intersect at a same point ^ ® =1+ 1
1 ¡ p+3
p¡ 2
2 p ¡ 1.






3¡2p and both managers not working hard otherwise.












and both managers not working hard for the remaining values of °.
For the considered parameter space (® 2 [1+
Ã
p;1+2Ã]), it is important to know the position
of ^ ® compared to these corner values. The position of ^ ® is determined by p:i fpis smaller than
0:64, then ^ ®<1+
Ã
p, while if p>0 : 642 ) ^ ®>1+2 Ã.
For simplicity, we suppose that ^ ® ¸ 1+2 Ãand sum up the results into a proposition.
Proposition 10 When the corporate headquarter always re¯nance the most productive division,
the optimal managerial e®ort is:
- Both managers not working hard if ° ·
2(p+1)
p® ¡ 1, and ® 2 [1;1+2 Ã] .
- Only the manager of the most productive division works hard if ° ¸
2(p+1)
p® ¡1, and ® 2 [1;1+
Ã
p]
or if ° 2 [
2(p+1)




1¡p] and ® 2 [1 +
Ã
p;1+2 Ã] .





1¡p and ® 2




®(1¡p)(3p¡1) and ® ¸ ~ ®.
- Both manager working hard in all the other cases.
34C Proofs
C.1 Proof of proposition 1
(i) Suppose that p ¡ q ¸ c: If the headquarter wants to liquidate the division then it chooses
the contract (1; c
p) and always imposes a high e®ort. This yields a pro¯t of p ¡ c for all values
of °i®. If the headquarter wants to continue the division then it chooses the contract ( c
p°i®;1)
and imposes the high e®ort i® °i® ¸ c
p¡q: Hence, the headquarter's pro¯t in the continuation
case is p°i® ¡ c if °i® ¸ c
p¡q and q°i® if °i®< c
p ¡ q ·1.
Now if °i® ¸ 1 the headquarter imposes high e®ort in continuation and the NPV rule clearly
holds: p°i® ¡ c ¸ p ¡ c , °i® ¸ 1: If °i®<1 then the headquarter prefers the low e®ort in
continuation when °i®< c
p ¡ q and the high e®ort otherwise (in which case the NPV rule clearly
holds). The highest possible pro¯t from the continuation pro¯t with a low e®ort is q c
p¡q which
is less than the pro¯t of stopping given our initial supposition: q c
p¡q <p¡c,p¡q¸c:
(ii) Suppose that p¡q<c . If the headquarter wants to liquidate the division then it always
imposes a low e®ort. This yields a pro¯t of q for all values of °i®. The liquidation contract
(1; c
p) is less pro¯table that the continuation contract ( c
p°i®;1) with the headquarter imposing a
low e®ort there too i® q°i® ¸ q , °i® ¸ 1. Since a high e®ort dominates a low e®ort in the
continuation case only if °i® ¸ c
p¡q > 1 this establishes the NPV rule.




p2(C1(±1)+C 2( ± 2)) + p(1 ¡ p)C1(±1)+( 1¡p ) pC1(±1)
subject to:
±2 · 1 ¡ 1
® (Continuation Constraint)






It is immediate that ±1 = c
(p¡q)(1¡p)°® so that we have 2 possibilities for ±2 depending on
which constraint binds ¯rst, the incentive constraint or the transfer constraint.
i) Suppose that the incentive constraint binds ¯rst. Then ±2 = c
(p¡q)p® and the continuation
constraint becomes ® ¸ 1+ c
p ¡ q
1




2 p ¡ 1
p (1¡p):
ii) Suppose then that the transfer constraint binds ¯rst. Then ±2 = c
(p¡q)p® +1¡°and




1¡p) and the incentive constraint becomes




2 p ¡ 1
p (1¡p):





2 p ¡ 1
p (1¡p):
C.3 Proof of proposition 9
Derivation of the °¤ function: °¤(®) is the minimal value of ° such that if ° ¸ °¤, the
conglomerate has a premium compared to a portfolio of single division ¯rms, if the conglomerate
35always re¯nance the most pro¯table division.
When ® · 1+
Ã
p, a conglomerate that transfers resources, worths V LL if ° ·
2(p+1)




4, the conglomerate with two low e®orts has always a lower value than V SA29. Then,
there is a conglomerate premium if:
V HL













For ® 2 [1+
Ã





where it worths V HH
1 .
We can show that if V HH
1 >VHL
1 then V HH








Last, we have to ¯nd the °¤ function for ® ¸ 1+2 Ã. In this case, we just have to compare
V LH with V SA:
V LH
















® for ® ¸ 1+2 Ã
Is there a conglomerate discount? If ° is smaller than 1 + 1
® the conglomerate has the
same value than a portfolio of single division ¯rms (proposition 4). If ° is greater than °¤, there
is a conglomerate premium. There is a conglomerate discount if: °¤ > 1+ 1
®. Which is true for
a l lv a l u e so f® .
29If p<
3
4, for low values of °, V
LL >V
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